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Simplified quantum bit commitment using single photon nonlocality
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
We simplified our previously proposed quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol based on the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, by replacing symmetric beam splitters with asymmetric ones. It
eliminates the need for random sending time of the photons; thus, the feasibility and efficiency are
both improved. The protocol is immune to the cheating strategy in the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go
theorem of unconditionally secure QBC, because the density matrices of the committed states do
not satisfy a crucial condition on which the no-go theorem holds.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.St, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) [1, 2] is a two-party
cryptography including two phases. In the commit phase,
Alice (the sender of the commitment) decides the value of
the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and sends
Bob (the receiver of the commitment) a piece of evidence,
e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the unveil phase,
Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it with
the evidence. An unconditionally secure QBC protocol
needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the
value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob
cannot know b before the unveil phase) without relying
on any computational assumption.
QBC is recognized as an essential primitive for quan-
tum cryptography, as it is the building block for quantum
multi-party secure computations and more complicated
“post-cold-war era” multi-party cryptographic protocols
[3, 4]. Unfortunately, it is widely accepted that uncon-
ditionally secure QBC is impossible [5]-[28], despite of
some attempts toward secure ones (e.g., [29–34] and the
references therein). This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-
Chau (MLC) no-go theorem, was considered as putting a
serious drawback on quantum cryptography. (Note that
cheat-sensitive QBC [35–37] is not covered, as its security
goal is defined differently from that of the QBC studied
in the current paper.)
Very recently, we proposed a QBC protocol using or-
thogonal states [29], where the density matrices do not
satisfy a crucial condition on which the MLC no-go the-
orem holds. The protocol is based on the Goldenberg-
Vaidman (GV) quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme
[38], which makes use of the Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter involving symmetric beam splitters. Koashi and
Imoto [39] pointed out that the GV QKD scheme can
be simplified by replacing the symmetric beam splitters
with asymmetric ones. Here we will apply the same idea
to propose a simplified version of our QBC protocol, so
that it can be more feasible and efficient.
In the next section, we introduce some basic notations
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and settings used throughout the paper. The Koashi-
Imoto (KI) QKD scheme will be briefly reviewed in sec-
tion III. Then we propose our QBC protocol in section
IV, and analyze its security in section V. The feasibility
will be discussed in section VI. Section VII summarizes
the conclusion and gives some remarks. An example of
the technical attack mentioned in section VI will be pro-
vided in the appendix.
II. NOTATIONS AND SETTINGS
Generally, in both QKD and QBC the two participants
are called Alice and Bob. But similar to [29], in our
current QBC protocol, the behavior of Bob is more like
that of the eavesdropper rather than the Bob in QKD. To
avoid confusion, here we use the names in the following
way. In QKD, the sender of the secret information is
called Alice, the receiver is renamed as Charlie instead
of Bob, and the external eavesdropper is called Eve. In
QBC, the sender of the commitment is Alice, the receiver
is Bob, and there is no Eve since QBC merely deals with
the cheating from internal dishonest participants, instead
of external eavesdropping.
As our main interest is focused on the theoretical possi-
bility of secure QBC, we will only consider the ideal case
where no transmission error occurs in the communication
channels, nor there are detection loss or dark counts, etc.
III. THE KOASHI-IMOTO QKD SCHEME
Our QBC proposal is inspired by the KI QKD scheme
[39], which makes use of the Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ter illustrated in FIG. 1. Let R and T denote the reflec-
tivity and transmissivity of the asymmetric beam split-
ters BS1 and BS2, with R + T = 1 and R 6= T . Alice
encodes the bit values 0 and 1 she wants to transmit to
Charlie, respectively, using two orthogonal states
0 → |Ψ0〉 ≡
√
T |0〉X |1〉Y − i
√
R |1〉X |0〉Y ,
1 → |Ψ1〉 ≡
√
T |1〉X |0〉Y − i
√
R |0〉X |1〉Y . (1)
Here |m〉j is the m photon Fock state for the arm j =
X,Y . That is, each |Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉 is split into two localized
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FIG. 1: Diagram of the experimental implementation of the Koashi-Imoto QKD scheme [39]. The state of a photon produced
by the source S0 (S1) will become |Ψ0〉 =
√
T |0〉
X
|1〉
Y
− i
√
R |1〉
X
|0〉
Y
(|Ψ1〉 =
√
T |1〉
X
|0〉
Y
− i
√
R |0〉
X
|1〉
Y
) after passing
the asymmetric beam splitter BS1 with reflectivity R and transmissivity T . The two wave packets of the same photon are sent
through channels X and Y respectively. When no eavesdropper presented, the storage rings SR1, SR2, the mirrors M1, M2
and the phase shifter pi will ensure the complete apparatus work as a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, so that |Ψ0〉 (|Ψ1〉) will be
detected by the detector D0 (D1) with certainty.
wave packets, and sent to Charlie separately in quantum
channels X and Y , respectively; thus single photon non-
locality is presented. This is done by sending a single
photon either from the source S0 (sending |Ψ0〉) or from
the source S1 (sending |Ψ1〉), then splitting it with the
beam splitter BS1 made of a half-silvered mirror (note
that polarizing beam splitters are not recommended due
to the security problem addressed at the end of section 6
of [29]).
To ensure the security of the transmission, the wave
packet in channel Y is delayed by the storage ring SR1,
which introduces a sufficiently long delay time τ so that
this wave packet will not leave Alice’s site until the
other wave packet in channel X already entered Charlie’s
site. Thus the two wave packets of the same photon are
never present together in the transmission channels. This
makes it impossible for Eve to prepare and send Charlie
a perfect clone on time if she waits to intercept and mea-
sure both wave packets, even though |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are
orthogonal, because she has to decide what to resend to
channel X before she can receive anything from channel
Y . On the other hand, when no eavesdropping occurs,
Charlie can distinguish |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 unambiguously by
adding a storage ring SR2 to channelX whose delay time
is also τ , while introducing a phase shift pi to channel Y .
The two wave packets of the same photon will then re-
combine and interfere on the beam splitter BS2, which
is identical to BS1. Thus the complete apparatus of Al-
ice and Charlie forms a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, so
that |Ψ0〉 (|Ψ1〉) will always make the detector D0 (D1)
click with certainty, allowing Charlie to decode the trans-
mitted bit correctly. Any mismatched result between Al-
ice’s transmitted state and Charlie’s measurement will
immediately reveals the presence of Eve [39].
Comparing with the GV QKD scheme [38], the key
difference is that BS1 and BS2 in the KI scheme are
asymmetric beam splitters, while the GV scheme uses
symmetric ones. The advantage of this modification is
that the sending time of each photon can be fixed and
publicly known beforehand, while in the GV scheme it
has to be random and kept secret from Eve until the
security check.
An important fact that will be useful for our QBC
protocol is that, since the KI scheme is unconditionally
secure, it is clear that Eve’s intercept-resend attack will
always be detected with a nontrivial probability. That
is, if she intercepts a state sent from Alice and decodes
a nontrivial amount of information, then the state she
resends to Charlie cannot always make Charlie’s correct
detector click at the right time with the probability 100%,
no matter what is Eve’s strategy on preparing the resent
state. There will always be a nontrivial probability that
the resent state will be detected by the wrong detector
(the one that should not click when no eavesdropping
presented), or at the wrong time (which is earlier or later
than the correct arrival time when the state is not inter-
cepted). Please see [39] for the rigorous proof, as well
as some examples showing why Eve’s strategies do not
work.
IV. OUR QBC PROTOCOL
As illustrated in FIG. 2, to build a QBC protocol upon
the above KI QKD scheme, we treat Charlie’s site as a
part of Alice’s, so that the two parties merge into one.
Alice sends out a bit-string c encoded with the above or-
thogonal states, whose value is related to the bit b she
wants to commit. Then she receives the states herself.
Meanwhile, let Bob take the role of Eve. His action shifts
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FIG. 2: Diagram for the apparatus of the QBC protocol when Bob chooses the intercept mode. He measures Alice’s photon
using the same device as that of Alice’s, while sending another photon to Alice according to a certain strategy (corresponding
to the device illustrated as the black box in the diagram) to reduce Alice’s probability of finding his interception.
between two modes. In the bypass mode, he simply does
nothing so that the corresponding parts of the states re-
turn to Alice intact. In the intercept mode, he applies the
intercept-resend attack. That is, he intercepts the state
and decodes the corresponding bit (which can be done
using the same device as that of Charlie’s), and prepares
a fake state to resend to Alice on time. While there could
be many strategies for Bob to prepare the resent state,
we use ε to denote the lower bound of the average prob-
ability for his resent state to be caught in Alice’s check.
As we mentioned above, the unconditional security of the
KI QKD scheme guarantees that ε cannot always equal
exactly to zero for both |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 even when Bob
uses the optimal strategy. Therefore, Alice is able to es-
timate the upper bound of the frequency of the presence
of the intercept mode, to limit Bob from intercepting the
whole string c, so that the value of the committed bit b
can be made concealing. Meanwhile, since ε < 1, at the
end of the commit phase there will be some bits of the
string become known to Bob, while Alice does not know
the exact position of all these bits. Thus she cannot al-
ter string c freely at a later time, making the protocol
binding. The complete QBC protocol is described below.
The commit protocol:
(1) Bob chooses a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C [2] and
announces it to Alice, where n, k, d are agreed on by both
Alice and Bob.
(2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit string r =
(r1r2...rn) ∈ {0, 1}n and announces it to Bob. This
makes any n-bit codeword c = (c1c2...cn) in C sorted
into either of the two subsets C(0) ≡ {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = 0}
and C(1) ≡ {c ∈ C|c⊙ r = 1}. Here c⊙ r ≡
n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri .
(3) Now Alice decides the value of the bit b that she
wants to commit. Then she chooses a codeword c from
C(b) randomly.
(4) Alice encodes each bit of this specific c as ci →
|Ψci〉 where the state |Ψci〉 is defined by equation (1).
She sends Bob the two wave packets of the same state
separately in channels X and Y , with the storage ring
SR1 on channel Y introducing a delay time τ known to
Bob.
(5) For each of Alice’ states |Ψci〉 (i = 1, ..., n), Bob
chooses the intercept mode with probability f (f < 1 −
d/n) and the bypass mode with probability 1− f .
If Bob chooses to apply the bypass mode, he simply
keeps channels X and Y intact so that the state sent
from Alice will be returned to her detectors as is.
Else if Bob chooses to apply the intercept mode, he
uses the same measurement device as that of Alice’s, to
measure |Ψci〉 so that he can decode ci with certainty.
Meanwhile, he prepares another state and sends it back
to channels X and Y at the right time, i.e., the time
which can ensure that it reaches Alice’s detectors at a
time that looks as if Bob were applying the bypass mode.
There are many different strategies how Bob sends this
state (thus we left this part of Bob’s device as a black box
in FIG. 2). One of the simplest ways is to use the same
device that Alice uses for sending her state. More strate-
gies will be discussed in section V.A. It will be shown
there that all these strategies cannot hurt the security
of the protocol, so that Bob are allowed to use any of
them here. As stated above, in any strategy there is a
nonvanishing probability that Bob’s resent state does not
equal to Alice’s original |Ψci〉 since he has to send it be-
fore completing the measurement on |Ψci〉 (to be further
explained in section V.A too). Let ε be the lower bound
4of this probability for all these strategies.
(6) Alice uses the same device that Charlie used in the
KI QKD scheme, to measure the output of the quantum
channels from Bob. She counts how many times her mea-
surement results do not match the states she sent, and
denotes it as n′. From step (5) it can be shown that
n′ ∼ εfn. Thus Alice can estimate the upper bound of
the probability of Bob choosing the intercept mode as
f ∼ n′/(εn). Alice agrees to continue with the protocol
if she finds f < 1−d/n, which means that the number of
ci’s known to Bob is fn < n−d. Otherwise she concludes
that Bob is cheating.
The unveil protocol:
(7) Alice announces the values of b and the specific
c = (c1c2...cn) she chose.
(8) Bob accepts the commitment if c ⊙ r = b and c is
indeed a codeword from C, and every ci agrees with the
state |Ψci〉 he detected in the intercept mode.
V. SECURITY
A. Basic ideas
For easy understanding, here we will first give a heuris-
tic explanation of the security of the protocol. A more
general theoretical proof will be provided in section V.B.
The binary linear (n, k, d)-code C used in the protocol
can simply be viewed as a set of classical n-bit strings.
Each string is called a codeword. This set of strings has
two features.
(A) Among all the 2n possible choices of n-bit strings,
only a particular set of the size ∼ 2k (k < n) is selected
to form this set.
(B) The distance (i.e., the number of different bits)
between any two codewords in this set is not less than d
(d < n).
Feature (A) puts a limit on Alice’s freedom on choos-
ing the initial state |ψc〉 ≡ |Ψc1〉 ⊗ |Ψc2〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψci〉 ⊗
... ⊗ |Ψcn〉, since each |Ψci〉 (i = 1, ..., n) cannot be cho-
sen independently. Instead, the string c = (c1c2...cn)
formed by the indices ci’s can only be chosen among the
codewords. Meanwhile, feature (B) guarantees that if Al-
ice wants to change the string c from one codeword into
another so that the value of her committed b can be al-
tered, she needs to change at least d bits of the codeword
c. But among the n states she sent to Bob, there are only
n′ ∼ εfn states which she knows for sure that Bob has
applied the intercept mode. For each of the rest n − n′
states, her measurement result always matches the state
she sent, so that she cannot distinguish unambiguously
whether Bob has applied the bypass mode or the inter-
cept mode. If it was the intercept mode, Bob already
knew the corresponding bit ci of the codeword c, so that
Alice’s altering it will be caught inevitably. Rigorously
speaking, among these n−n′ states, the probability that
Bob has applied the intercept mode is
p =
fn− n′
n− n′ =
f − εf
1− εf . (2)
Therefore Alice’s altering one bit of the codeword will
stand the probability p to be detected, and her proba-
bility of altering ≥ d bits without being detected will be
(1−p)d. Alternatively, Alice may prepare |ψc〉 initially in
a state where c is not a codeword. Instead, it is half-way
between two codewords, so that changing d/2 will be suf-
ficient to turn it into one of the codewords. In this case,
her probability of escaping the detection will be increased
to (1− p)d/2. Nevertheless, in either way the probability
drops exponentially as d increases. Thus it can be made
arbitrarily close to zero.
On the other hand, feature (A) also guarantees that
the number of different codewords having less than n−d
bits in common increases exponentially with k. This is
the key that makes our protocol secure against Bob, as
Alice can bound the frequency f that Bob applies the in-
tercept mode, which in turns bounds the number of the
bits known to Bob so that he cannot know Alice’s actual
choice of the codeword. The reason is that in step (5)
of the protocol, no matter what is the strategy that Bob
used in his intercept mode to prepare the resent state, it
can be shown that his resent state cannot always equal
to the |Ψci〉 he received from Alice, as long as he wants
to ensure that the time it reaches Alice’s detectors will
show no difference than the case where he were applying
the bypass mode. That is, either Bob’s resent state in
the intercept mode will inevitably make Alice’s detectors
click earlier or later than the time it does when the by-
pass mode were used instead, or the resent state will be
different from |Ψci〉 with a nonvanishing probability ε.
To see why this is the case, let us first consider the
strategy where Bob prepares the resent state using the
same device that Alice uses for sending her |Ψci〉. Sup-
pose that the first wave packet of Alice’s |Ψci〉 enters
Bob’s site via channelX (before entering his storage ring)
at time ti (which should be agreed on by both Alice and
Bob beforehand). Then the second wave packet of |Ψci〉
will enter Bob’s site via channel Y at time ti+τ due to the
existence of the storage ring in Alice’s sending device (see
FIG. 2). As there is also another storage ring in Alice’s
measurment device, Bob must send the first wave packet
of his resent state into channel X at time ti, and send
the second wave packet into channel Y at time ti + τ , so
that they can reach Alice’s measurement device at a time
that looks like Bob is running the bypass mode. Here for
simplicity, we assume that the time for the wave packets
to travel the rest part of the channels (other than the
storage rings) is negligible. That is, the first wave packet
of Bob’s state needs to be sent before the second wave
packet of Alice’s |Ψci〉 reaches him. Otherwise his resent
state will reach Alice’s detectors later than the expected
arrival time when no interception occurs. Therefore, by
the time Bob prepares the resent state, he has not re-
ceived Alice’ state completely yet so he does not know
5the form of |Ψci〉. Thus his resent state cannot match
Alice’s state with probability 100%, and he cannot make
them match by his local operations acting solely on the
second wave packet of his resent state (the one to be sent
via channel Y ) after the first wave packet in channel X
was already sent.
On the other hand, suppose that Bob waits until ti+τ
so that Alice’s |Ψci〉 enters his measurement device com-
pletely, and prepares the resent state following the mea-
surement result. Then even though the form of the states
will match perfectly, the resent state will reach Alice’s
detectors much later than it should when Bob uses the
bypass mode, because the storage ring in channel X of
Alice’s measurement device will delay the corresponding
wave packet. This will make Alice aware that Bob is
using the intercept mode too.
Alternatively, there can be another strategy where Bob
simply sends all wave packets of his state simultaneously
via one of the channels alone, e.g., through channel X at
time ti or through channel Y at time ti + τ . But he will
not be able to guarantee which of Alice’s detectors will
click with certainty.
Though here we have only analyzed the above few
strategies as examples, the result is common. That is,
in any strategy potentially existed, there will be a non-
vanishing probability (let ε denote the lower bound of
the probability for all strategies) that Alice will find a
mismatched result between the |Ψci〉 she sent and her
measurement on the state she received from Bob, or the
arrival time of Bob’s state is different from what it should
be in the bypass mode. This is because, as mentioned in
section IV, the role of Bob in our protocol is actually the
same as that of Eve in the KI QKD scheme [39]. If there
is a strategy which is not bounded by the above result,
then it can be utilized to fulfill a successful eavesdrop-
ping to the KI QKD scheme, which will conflict with the
existing proof of the unconditional security of the scheme
[39].
As a consequence, whenever Bob applies the intercept
mode, Alice can distinguish it from the bypass mode
with the probability ε. Then as described in step (6),
by counting the number n′ of the mismatched results,
Alice can estimate the upper bound of the probability of
Bob choosing the intercept mode as f ∼ n′/(εn). As she
agrees to continue only when f < 1 − d/n, it is guar-
anteed that during the commit phase, Bob knows only
fn < n− d bits of c. Since feature (A) of the binary lin-
ear (n, k, d)-code C ensures that the number of different
codewords having fn bits in common increases exponen-
tially with k, the potential choices for c are too much for
Bob to determine whether c belongs to the subset C(0)
or C(1). Thus the amount of information Bob gained on
the committed bit b before the unveil phase can be made
arbitrarily close to zero by increasing k.
Taking both Alice’s and Bob’s cases studied above into
consideration, we can see that fixing k/n and d/n while
increasing n will then result in a protocol secure against
both sides.
B. More general proof: evading the MLC no-go
theorem
While it is hard to find a completely general proof like
those for QKD [40] showing that the protocol is secure
against all cheating strategies that may potentially ex-
ist, here it can be shown that our protocol is at least
secure against the specific cheating strategy proposed in
the MLC theorem.
1. Essential of the no-go proof
As pinpointed out in section 4 of [29], while there are
many variations and extensions of the MLC no-go theo-
rem [5]-[28], their proofs all have the following common
features.
(I) The reduced model. According to the no-go proofs,
any QBC protocol can be reduced to the following model.
Alice and Bob share a quantum state in a given Hilbert
space. Each of them performs unitary transformations
on the state in turns. All measurements are performed
at the very end.
(II) The coding method. The quantum state corre-
sponding to the committed bit b has the form
|ψb〉 =
∑
j
λ
(b)
j
∣∣∣e(b)j
〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣f (b)j
〉
B
. (3)
Here the systems A and B are owned by Alice and Bob
respectively.
(III) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob’s
information on the committed bit is trivial before the un-
veil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should
satisfy
ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , (4)
where ρBb ≡ TrA |ψb〉 〈ψb| is the reduced density matrix
corresponding to Alice’s committed bit b, obtained by
tracing over system A in equation (3). Note that in some
presentation of the no-go proofs (e.g., [14, 16, 19, 26]),
this feature was expressed using the trace distance or the
fidelity instead of the reduced density matrices, while the
meaning remains the same.
(IV) The cheating strategy. As long as equation (4)
is satisfied, according to the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters
(HJW) theorem (a.k.a. the Uhlmann theorem, etc.) [41],
there exists a local unitary transformation for Alice to
map {
∣∣∣e(0)j
〉
A
} into {
∣∣∣e(1)j
〉
A
} successfully with a high
probability [41]. Thus a dishonest Alice can unveil the
state as either |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉 at her will with a high prob-
ability to escape Bob’s detection. Consequently, a con-
cealing QBC protocol cannot be binding.
62. Equivalent model of our protocol
Following the method of the MLC theorem to reduce
our protocol into an equivalent form where Alice and Bob
perform unitary transformations in turns on the quantum
state they share, we can see that our commit protocol is
essentially the following 3-stage process.
(i) Alice prepares and sends Bob a system α containing
n qubits |Ψci〉 (i = 1, ..., n).
(ii) Bob prepares an n-qubit system β and an n-qutrit
system γ. Then he performs an operation UB on the
combined system β ⊗ α⊗ γ.
(iii) Bob sends system β to Alice.
In this process, the initial state of each qubit in β is
chosen at Bob’s choice, and kept secret from Alice. The
system γ is for storing the result of Bob’s measurement
on α. The three orthogonal states of each qutrit in γ
are denoted as |0〉, |1〉 and |2〉, where |0〉 (|1〉) means
that the measurement result of |Ψci〉 is ci = 0 (ci = 1),
and |2〉 means that |Ψci〉 is not measured so that the
result remains unknown. All the n qutrits in system γ
are initialized in |2〉. The operation UB = u1⊗u2⊗...⊗un
is defined by the mode that Bob chooses for each qubit
in α, where each ui (i = 1, ..., n) is a 3-particle operator
acting on the i-th qubits/qutrit of β, α and γ. If Bob
chooses the bypass mode for the i-th qubit of α, then
ui = ubyp ≡ Pβα ⊗ Iγ . (5)
Here Pβα is a 2-qubit permutation operator which inter-
changes the states of the i-th qubits of α and β, and Iγ
is the identity operator that keeps the i-th qutrit of γ
unchanged. Or if Bob chooses the intercept mode for the
i-th qubit of α, then
ui = uint ≡ Iβ ⊗ (|Ψ0〉α 〈Ψ0| ⊗ µ(0)γ + |Ψ1〉α 〈Ψ1| ⊗ µ(1)γ ).
(6)
Here Iβ is the identity operator on the i-th qubit of β,
µ
(0)
γ (µ
(1)
γ ) is an unitary transformation on the i-th qutrit
of γ which can map the state |2〉 into |0〉 (|1〉). That is,
applying uint is equivalent to measuring the i-th qubit
of α and storing the result in the i-th qutrit of γ, while
keeping the i-th qubit of β unchanged. Among all the
possible forms of the operation UB, Bob chooses one of
those that can pass the security check in step (6) of our
original protocol in section IV (i.e., the number of uint
in UB should be fn < n− d), and keeps his choice secret
from Alice.
3. Security against Alice’s cheating
Now we will show why the specific cheating strategy in
the MLC theorem does not apply to our protocol. With
the above equivalent description, we can see that after the
commit phase, the density matrix of the systems shared
between Alice and Bob is in the form UB(ρ
β⊗ρα⊗ργ)U †B,
where ρβ, ρα and ργ are the density matrices for the
systems β, α and γ, respectively. Note that here the
first n qubits are now owned by Alice, i.e., they serve
like the system A in equation (3) even though system β
was prepared by Bob. Meanwhile, the rest qubits and
qutrits now belong to Bob and serve like the system B
in equation (3), even though system α was prepared by
Alice.
Let ρα0 (ρ
α
1 ) denote the initial density matrix of system
α prepared by Alice, that can unveil the committed bit
as b = 0 (b = 1). According to the MLC theorem, now
the goal for an dishonest Alice is to find a local unitary
transformation UA acting on the n qubits at her side
alone, that can map ρB0 into ρ
B
1 . That is, UA should
satisfy
UA[UB(ρ
β⊗ρα0 ⊗ργ)U †B]U †A = UB(ρβ⊗ρα1 ⊗ργ)U †B. (7)
Applying U †B(...)UB on both sides of this equation, we
yield
(U †BUAUB)(ρ
β⊗ρα0⊗ργ)(U †BUAUB)† = ρβ⊗ρα1⊗ργ. (8)
Recall that UB was kept secret from Alice, thus she has
to choose an UA which is independent of UB. Meanwhile,
the right side of equation (8) is independent of UB too.
Therefore, equation (8) cannot be satisfied in general,
unless UA always commutes with the specific UB’s that
Bob may choose in the protocol. In this case U †BUAUB =
UAU
†
BUB = UA, and equation (8) becomes
UA(ρ
β ⊗ ρα0 ⊗ ργ)U †A = ρβ ⊗ ρα1 ⊗ ργ . (9)
In many previous QBC protocols (e.g. [1, 2]) there is
ρα0 = ρ
α
1 . Then the HJW theorem guarantees that such
a local UA exists, so that Alice can alter the value of
her committed bit. This is why the cheating strategy
in the MLC theorem is always successful in such pro-
tocols. However, as shown from equation (1), in our
protocol |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are orthogonal. Thus the state
|ψc〉 ≡ |Ψc1〉⊗ |Ψc2〉⊗ ...⊗ |Ψci〉⊗ ...⊗ |Ψcn〉 correspond-
ing to a specific codeword c is orthogonal to the state
corresponding to any other codeword. Consequently, our
QBC protocol satisfies ρα0 ⊥ ρα1 , which is a crucial dif-
ference from previous insecure protocols. In this case
the HJW theorem does not apply, making Alice unable
to find an local transformation UA acting on her system
(i.e., system β) alone while satisfying equation (9). For
this reason, our protocol is immune to the specific cheat-
ing strategy proposed in the MLC no-go theorem.
4. Security against Bob’s cheating
As the system α Alice sent to Bob in our QBC protocol
satisfies ρα0 ⊥ ρα1 , at the first glance it seems that Bob can
simply perform a measurementM to project the state of
α into the Hilbert spaces supported by ραb (b = 0, 1) and
thus learn the value of Alice’s committed b. But this
is not true, because as shown above, the density matrix
7of the systems shared between Alice and Bob after the
commit phase is UB(ρ
β ⊗ ρα ⊗ ργ)U †B. That is, Bob is
required to perform the operation UB on system α. This
UB is incommutable with the measurement M on α for
distinguishing ρα0 and ρ
α
1 , since equation (5) indicates
that UB contains permutation operators which act on
not only system α, but also other systems. Therefore,
UB and M cannot be both applied on α. Bob can only
choose one of them. The timing of the sending of the
states in the protocol also prevents Bob from keeping
system β unsent until he receives the entire system α.
Thus he needs to decide on the fly which operation to
apply. Once he applied UB, then the state of α will be
disturbed so that Bob will lose the chance to apply M
on it for decoding b.
Moreover, the difference between UB and M is de-
tectable to Alice. According to step (5) of our protocol,
an UB is considered legitimate if it includes the operator
ubyp (i.e., Bob is using the bypass mode) for (1−f)n > d
times. On the contrary, because the minimal distance
between the codewords is d, the number of ubyp in M
must be less than d. Otherwise as a basic property of the
binary linear (n, k, d)-code, the number of the possible
codewords having less than n− d bits in common will be
at the order of magnitude of 2k so that such an M can
provide only trivial information on the value of Alice’s
committed b. But as elaborated in section V.A, the un-
conditional security of the KI QKD scheme [39] ensures
that, for each of Alice’s state |Ψci〉 which Bob applies the
intercept mode, his resent state can equal to |Ψci〉 with
the probability 1 − ε only, where there is always ε > 0
no matter which resend strategy Bob uses. When the
number of the applied bypass mode is less than d, Alice
will find that the number of mismatched result between
her received state and the original |Ψci〉 she sent will be
n′ > ε(n− d). If she takes f ≡ n′/(εn) as stated in step
(6) of the protocol, then she will find that f > 1 − d/n.
Thus she knows that Bob was attempting to apply the
operation M instead of a legitimate UB.
Namely, while Alice’s committed state satisfies ρα0 ⊥
ρα1 so that it is distinguishable to Bob, Alice’s security
check in the protocol requires Bob to perform an oper-
ation UB, which is incommutable with the operation M
for distinguishing ρα0 and ρ
α
1 . The protocol thus becomes
concealing against Bob.
VI. FEASIBILITY
In the above we focused only on the theoretical pos-
sibility of evading the MLC no-go theorem. But we can
see from FIG. 2 that our protocol is also very feasible, as
the required experimental technology is already available
today [42].
Also, as the secret random sending time is no longer
required, the commit phase will take less time than that
of our previous protocol [29], and the total number of
photons that Bob needs to send in the intercept mode will
be significantly reduced. More rigorously, suppose that
the minimal time for Bob to shift between the intercept
and bypass modes is ∆. When both protocols choose
the same n as the length of the codewords, our previous
protocol [29] requires Bob to send sf (s >> n. Note
that f was denoted as α in [29]) photons in total, and
the duration time of the commit phase is s∆. But in
the current protocol, the photon number is reduced to
nf , and the duration time is n∆. As it was suggested in
section 3 of [29] that a typical choice of the parameters
is s/n = 10, we can see that the current protocol can be
10 times more efficient than our previous one [29].
There is another advantage of removing the need to
keep the sending time secret at first. That is, now Alice
and Bob can determine the binary linear (n, k, d)-code
C and decide on the sending time of the states |Ψci〉
(i = 1, ..., n) beforehand, so that no more classical com-
munication is needed at all during the commit phase, un-
less one of them finds the other participant cheating and
announces to abort. Therefore, it not only reduces the
communication cost significantly, but also makes it easier
for security analysis and comparison with the MLC theo-
rem, which was generally deduced in a theoretical model
where classical communication is not presented directly.
Nevertheless, under practical settings, some more se-
curity checks should be added against technical attacks.
Especially, the physical systems implementing the states
may actually have other degrees of freedom, which leave
rooms for Alice’s cheating. For example, she may send
photons with certain polarization or frequency, so that
she can distinguish them from the photons Bob sends in
the intercept mode. In this case, Bob and Alice should
discuss at the beginning of the protocol, to limit these
degrees of freedom to a single mode. In step (5) when
Bob chooses the intercept mode, he should also measure
occasionally these degrees of freedom of some of Alice’s
photons, instead of performing the measurement in the
original step (5). Then if Alice wants to send distin-
guishable photons with a high probability so that they
are sufficient for her cheating, she will inevitably be de-
tected.
Moreover, when Bob applies the bypass mode, he
should add phase shifters to both channels X and Y to
introduce the same phase shift in both channels so that
an honest Alice will not be affected (to be explained in
the appendix), while the amount of this phase shift is
randomly chosen and kept secret from Alice, so that the
counterfactual attack described in the appendix can be
defeated.
Note that all these technical attacks and the corre-
sponding modifications are due to the imperfection of
the physical systems implementing the protocol. They
should not be messed with the theoretical possibility of
evading the MLC no-go theorem.
8VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
In conclusion, inspired by the KI simplified version [39]
of the GV QKD scheme [38], we improved our previously
proposed QBC protocol [29], and proved that it is im-
mune to the specific cheating strategy used in the MLC
no-go theorem of unconditionally secure QBC. The key
reason is that the density matrices of Alice’s states corre-
sponding to the committed values 0 and 1 are orthogonal
to each other, making her unable to find the local uni-
tary transformation for the cheating by using the HJW
theorem. Meanwhile, the protocol remains concealing
against Bob because he is required to perform another
operation, which is incommutable with the measurement
for distinguishing the density matrices.
However, there may potentially exist innumerous
cheating strategies other than the one in the MLC the-
orem. It is natural to ask whether our protocol can be
unconditionally secure against all these strategies. A rig-
orous evaluation of the upper bound of the cheating prob-
ability is also needed. For example, our protocol involves
a probability ε which denotes the lower bound of the av-
erage probability for Bob’s resent state in step (5) to be
caught in Alice’s check. The exact value of ε should be
determined by the rigorous quantitatively security anal-
ysis of the KI QKD scheme. Unfortunately, such a value
was not yet provided in the literature [39]. In turns, the
parameters k and d in the binary linear (n, k, d)-code C
used in our protocol need to be chosen according to ε.
Therefore it remains unknown whether the cheater can
have a nontrivial probability of success if these parame-
ters are improperly chosen. We would like to leave these
questions open for future researches.
Though the current QBC protocol and the one in [29]
have similarities in many ways, the underlying origins of
their security against Bob are somewhat different. While
both protocols are immune to Bob’s cheating because
they are based on unconditionally secure QKD schemes,
as pointed out in [39], the GV QKD scheme can actu-
ally be viewed as utilizing three orthogonal states – two
photon states and one vacuum state. Its security is pro-
vided by the random sending time of the photons. On
the contrary, the KI QKD scheme does not require the
vacuum state and the secret sending time. The security
is guaranteed by the fact that the eavesdropper cannot
fake the states with certainty owe to the use of the asym-
metric beam splitters. Similarly, the security of the QBC
protocol in [29] against Bob is based on Alice’s random
sending time that remains secret before the last step of
the commit phase, while in our current QBC proposal,
it is because Bob cannot fake the states with certainty
when he runs the intercept mode. Therefore our cur-
rent protocol is more than merely a simplification on the
presentation.
The work was supported in part by the NSF of China,
the NSF of Guangdong province, and the Foundation of
Zhongshan University Advanced Research Center.
Appendix A: Defeating the counterfactual attack
As we mentioned in Sec. 6, under practical settings
our QBC protocol may need some modifications against
technical attacks. Here we give such an example.
Recently a cheating strategy against counterfactual
QKD protocols [43, 44] was proposed [45]. Unlike gen-
eral intercept-resend attacks in which measurements are
performed on the quantum states carrying the secret in-
formation, in this strategy the cheater makes use of quan-
tum counterfactual effect to detect the working modes of
the devices of other participants. Thus it was named “the
counterfactual attack” [45]. Here we will skip how it ap-
plies to QKD protocols, while focus only on its impact
on our QBC protocol.
FIG. 3 illustrates the apparatus for the attack [45].
The core is a “fictitious” beam splitter (FBS) which has
the following functions.
(f1) Any photon hitting the FBS from path c will be
reflected with certainty.
(f2) When the paths a and b are adjusted correctly,
two wave packets coming from paths a and b, respectively,
will interfere and combine together, and enter path c with
certainty.
(f3) Any photon hitting the FBS from path a alone will
pass through the FBS and enter path d with certainty.
An ideal FBS that can realize these functions faithfully
does not exist in principle. Thus it is called “fictitious”.
For example, devices with the functions (f2) and (f3) may
not accomplish the function (f1) perfectly, i.e., a photon
coming from path c could pass the devices with a nontriv-
ial probability, making the attack detectable. However,
FBS can be implemented approximately by using an in-
finite number of ordinary BS [44, 45]. In practice, the
number of BS involved in the implementation has to be
finite. But if the deviation from an ideal FBS is too small
to be detected within the capability of available technol-
ogy, then the attack could become a real threat.
Suppose that an ideal FBS is available to a dishonest
Alice in our QBC protocol. When she is supposed to send
Bob a state in step (4), she runs both the FBS system
in FIG. 3 and the apparatus in the honest protocol (i.e.,
the one shown in FIG. 2) simultaneously in parallel, with
path b of the FBS system connecting to both the input
and output of Bob’s channel X (or both the input and
output of Bob’s channel Y ). The apparatus in FIG. 2
works as usual so that the protocol can be executed as
if she is honest, while the FBS system serves as a probe
to detect Bob’s mode. According to the function (f2)
of the FBS, whenever Bob applies the bypass mode in
step (5), the wave packets of a photon Alice sent to the
FBS will be returned from both paths a and b so that
the detector Dc will click with certainty. On the other
hand, whenever Bob applies the intercept mode, an ideal
FBS can guarantee that Dc will never click as path b is
actually blocked. Therefore Alice can learn Bob’s mode
unambiguously. Since Bob does not know the state |Ψci〉
Alice sends when he applies the bypass mode, Alice can
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FIG. 3: Diagram of the apparatus for Alice’s counterfactual attack. A single-photon pulse produced by the source S passes
through the optical circulator C1 and hits the “fictitious” beam splitter (FBS) along path c. Path a is adjusted by the optical
delay OD, followed by a Faraday mirror FM . Any photon coming from path c from the right to the left will be detected by
the detector Dc, while the detector Dd detects any photon coming from path d. Path b is connected to both the input and
output of Bob’s channel X (or both the input and output of Bob’s channel Y ) via the optical circulator C2.
lie about the value of the corresponding ci freely, thus
alters her committed b in the unveil phase.
Nevertheless, it is easy to defeat this counterfactual
attack. As pointed out in Ref. [45], Bob’s randomizing
the optical length of path b is sufficient to destroy the
interference effect in the FBS system. Therefore in our
protocol, Bob can simply add extra phase shifters (other
than the one shown in FIG. 2) to both channels X and
Y when he applies the bypass mode, to introduce the
same phase shift eiθ in both channels, where the value
of θ is randomly chosen and kept secret from Alice, and
can vary for different |Ψci〉. In this case, after passing
Bob’s apparatus, Alice’s initial states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 will
become, respectively,
|Ψ0〉 → |Ψ′0〉 ≡
√
T (eiθ |0〉X)(eiθ |1〉Y )
−i
√
R(eiθ |1〉X)(eiθ |0〉Y ),
|Ψ1〉 → |Ψ′1〉 ≡
√
T (eiθ |1〉X)(eiθ |0〉Y )
−i
√
R(eiθ |0〉X)(eiθ |1〉Y ). (A1)
We can see that |Ψ′0〉 (|Ψ′1〉) differs from |Ψ0〉 (|Ψ1〉)
merely by a global factor ei2θ. It is well known that such
a global factor is not detectable. In fact, in our case the
interference pattern of the two wave packets meeting at
the beam splitter of Alice’s measurement device is de-
termined by their relative phase difference. No change
will be detected when they both receive a phase shift eiθ.
Thus an honest Alice who uses the original apparatus
described in FIG. 2 will still detect |Ψ′0〉 (|Ψ′1〉) as |Ψ0〉
(|Ψ1〉), even though she does not know the value of θ. On
the other hand, if Alice wants to apply the above counter-
factual attack, without knowing θ she cannot know how
to adjust path a to ensure Dc in FIG. 3 clicking with
certainty. Consequently, there will be times that Alice
does not know which mode Bob is running. Then the
number of ci’s that she can alter will be limited, which
is insufficient to change the committed b as long as the
value of d/n in our QBC protocol is properly chosen.
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